embracing a gaggle of divergent intuitions about what sorts of processes and relations should be counted as causal. It could, of course, turn out that the folk truism regarding causation would be compatible with the successful metaphysics of causation, yet expert opinion remains strongly divided on this issue. 21 In the literature on causation, there is in any case significant agreement around the idea that the attempt to identify a logical form of causal reasoning (be it common to both scientific theory and everyday thinking or not) has not been successful and is unlikely to be viable. A case in point is the so-called INUS condition, or the idea that a cause is an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. More succinctly, the key thought here is that a cause is a necessary component of a condition sufficient to the effect. 22 Various philosophers have remarked that conditions of logical necessity and sufficiency cannot yield an adequate explication of causal thinking. As Judea Pearl puts this idea, logical accounts cannot succeed because they fail to make a syntactic distinction between formulas that identify stable mechanisms and those that describe merely circumstantial conditions. 23 One clear indication of this problem involves contra-position, an elementary form of logical equivalence that is not mirrored by causal implications: "A causes B"
does not imply "not B causes not A." It remains to be seen whether sophisticated contemporary models of causation could be recruited to provide a revamped, causal analysis of narrativity.
In the sort of definition exemplified by (3), narrativity entails the representation not merely of events, but of those events constituted by sequences of purposeful action. In many versions of this condition, the actions constitutive of a story must be undertaken by one or more agents, and it is the structure of these agents' strivings that gives the narrative its requisite unity and closure. A significant variation within this type of concept of narrative has to do with whether the purposive activities or plans are represented as unfolding in a routine manner. Such cases are sometimes contrasted to "genuine" stories, where something else, such as a complication, has to hap-pen.
Jerry R. Hobbs's above-cited clause, "generally in the face of some obstacle," acknowledges this sort of desideratum, yet does not make it essential to stories per se, perhaps because he deems this a constraint on good or interesting stories. And indeed, the expression "dull story describing routine problem-solving behavior" would not generally be thought oxymoronic. Many other theorists insist, however, that the representation of routine or "canonical" problem-solving activities cannot make a story. 24 David Herman, for example, proposes a scalar concept of narrativity in which the ratio of stereotypical to non-stereotypic behavior and events is a factor to be included along with temporal and causal organization. In other words, his hypothesis is that narrativity in-creases with a greater number and diversity of experiential repertoires accompanied by deviations from stereotypical expectations. 25 This move has the consequence of making degrees of narrativity relative to a context, since what is stereotypical in one setting is unexpected in another. Gregory Currie, who also advocates a scalar idea of narrativity (based on reason-based relations between particular events), similarly adverts to context-relative "thresholds" of narrativity, such that a discourse may be evaluated as highly narrative in one context of evaluation yet less so in another. There are significantly different formulations of this kind of condition in the literature, and it is not clear whether any of them captures an essential requirement of narrativity, as opposed to a context-relative valence, such as entertainment or a type of relevance.
While the preceding paragraphs should suffice to establish that expert elucidations of 'narrativity' and 'narration' diverge massively, it may be worth pointing out that other significant points of divergence pertain to the necessity of (a) an implicit or explicit teller or presenter of the events or actions and (b) an implicit "narratee" or figure to whom the narrative is addressed. Although some theorists think narrative entails a narrator, others have explicitly contradicted this idea, partly because they find no evidence of an omnipresent narrative voice or presenter in many radio plays, narrative paintings, and movies. Assumptions about the necessity of a narrator or addressee can be conjoined with any of the other content-related conditions I have just surveyed, the result being quite a variety of logically distinct proposals for the nature of narrativity. Gerald Prince, for example, articulates a definition in which narrative is the representation of real or fictive events by one or more narrators to one or more narratees or addressees. 26 All of these basic types of theses about the requisite content of a story or narrative are dependent on views about how the content of a discourse, utterance, or thought gets determined, and some dis-agreements over that difficult topic have implications for accounts of narrativity. Many theorists of narrative think a discourse's content, and thus its narrativity, depends on various contextual factors, including modes of reception, interpretation, or processing, the storyteller's goals or intentions, or some relational property, such as tellability, which depends on the attitudes of both the producers and receivers of utterances. 27 It is important to note that the widespread divergence I am limning here concerns not only attempts to articulate explicit, necessary, and jointly sufficient defining conditions (in keeping with a "classical" notion of concepts), but also a basic failure to agree over the classification of a range of concrete instances, as well as divergence over the reasons subtending such classifications. Some theorists assert that a detailed description of the his-tory of a glacier is an instance of narrative, but for others this is a perfect example of a discourse that is not a narrative or that has a zero or very low degree of narrativity (at least across a wide range of contexts of comparison). Recourse to a prototype theory of concepts has been recommended, but is not a viable solution. It seems helpful to observe that all reasonable parties agree that "The Fox and the Crow," Middlemarch, and
Bicycle Thieves (De Sica, 1948) category's very boundaries. In a context where interpretative speculation over these issues has yielded such disparate proposals, an appeal to empirical results would seem salutary. Yet controlled investigations into subjects' responses founder because reports and intuitions diverge, and a measurable property of narrativity has yet to be isolated. 28 To summarize only some of the major points of divergence surveyed above, several schematic, incompatible clusters of definitions, and corresponding concepts of narrativity, may be identified as follows:
Narrativity is constituted by (or increases with) the representation of (1) events (2) as temporally ordered, (3) as causally related, (4) as unified (for ex-ample, as involving the same substance or topic),and as (5) actions where (6) the agent(s) encounters and contends with nonroutine obstacles to the realization of his or her goals.
The conjunction of each of these conditions with the requirement of a narrator or presenter, narratee, or both yields additional definitional clusters (within each of which there can be significant divergence).
Given such an abundance of divergent definitional claims and contrasting intuitions about particular cases, we may safely conclude that 'narrative' and kindred terms in other languages (such as 'xu shi,' 'récit,' 'storia,' 'Erzählung,' 'fortaelling')remain deeply ambiguous. On what grounds, then, could we identify any one of these competing characterizations as the correct account of the essence of narrative? Perhaps a breakthrough will some-day be made, and it will be discovered which in-variant natural kind is labeled by the term 'narrative,' but given the current state of the art, arguments in which one of the several senses of 'narrative' or 'narrativity' gets put to any important use should shoulder the burden of justifying this exclusive usage. On this point bald assertion and unacknowledged stipulation are all too pervasive in the literature, and this author recommends an at least provisional agnosticism.
One conclusion that might be drawn at this point is that the literature on narrative and knowledge sampled in Section I is largely, if not entirely, a matter of equivocation, and that there can be no substantive disagreement or agreement. Yet this is not quite right. Many claims in this area can be fairly assessed by focusing on the arguments given for a link between a favored notion of narrativity and the candidate epistemic effects. In such cases, an appeal to truisms and relatively uncontroversial assumptions can allow us to show that this link has not been sufficiently established, and this even if the stipulation of the meaning of 'narrativity' were granted.
As a detailed engagement with the enormous literature on narrative and knowledge would re- Dawes bases his negative assessment of "good stories" on the idea that stories have a structure that tends to make them fall short of his favored explanatory and evidentiary criteria. Questions can be raised about Dawes's idea about what constitutes the structure of a story. For example, it is often contended that a bare conjunction of descriptions of particular events bearing no interesting relations to each other does not a narrative make-and this is a point on which many of the otherwise competing definitions converge. Also, the emphasis on particularity cannot be squared with prevalent intuitions about the story category. Aesop's fables are normally considered stories, and although there is a sense in which these narratives describe particular actions performed by particular animals, there is no genuine emphasis on particularities in these allegorical tales. Dawes does not, in any case, provide convincing grounds for his apparent assumption that the only necessary story elements are its descriptions of particular events or actions. According to some theorists of narrative, relations between descriptions of particular events and a narrator's implicit or explicit general points about this sort of event are one of the key narrative modes of discursive integration. 31 Setting aside various issues surrounding Dawes's assumptions about the nature of narrativity, we may independently ask whether Dawes's claims about "the structure of a story" can support his larger argument. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that it is correct to hold that the key to what makes a story a story is the representation of particular events or actions. 32 Such a quick and easy refutation, however, probably fails to do justice to Dawes's thinking.
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Perhaps his key insight is simply that there is a fairly strong positive correlation between hearing stories and buying into unwarranted explanations (which is why he writes that it is "nearly impossible" to ignore a good story). Yet even this idea can be reasonably questioned. If it were true that what makes a story a story is the representation of a single sequence of events, it may still be expected that actual utterances that tell stories usually incorporate other kinds of elements as well, and it is dubious to think the overall meaning and impact of such utterances are determined by their story component alone. But once we let in other components, the correlation fades, and talk of the bias in good stories becomes dubious.
Consider in this regard a passage from George Eliot's Middlemarch, a work widely recognized as an instance of narrative fiction. At one point in the novel, the attentive reader will have gathered that it is true in the fiction that Rosamond entertains a romantic passion for Will Ladislaw, and that Rosamond is aware that her husband Lydgate's financial difficulties may require them to move to London, which is something she ardently desires. Sitting at home in a state of languid melancholy and suspense, Rosamond entertains thoughts about a mysterious link between two events that are the objects of her hopes, namely, Ladislaw's hoped-for visit and some new urgency for the removal to London. The narrative continues:
She felt assured that the coming would be a potent cause of the going, without at all seeing how. This way of establishing sequences is too common to be fairly regarded as a peculiar folly in Rosamond. And it is precisely this sort of sequence which causes the greatest shock when it is sundered: for to see how an effect may be produced is often to see possible missings and checks; but to see nothing except the desirable cause, and close upon it the desirable effect, rids us of doubt and makes our minds strongly intuitive. That was the process going on in poor Rosamond. 33 Eliot's narration moves rather smoothly back and forth between remarks of a general nature and descriptions of a particular, imagined case-Rosamond's state of mind and her spurious, wishful causal hypothesis about a link between two desired events. The narrator tells us that Rosamond's fallacious manner of thinking is by no means particular to her; we are invited to contrast this common "folly" to another, more accurate sort of causal thinking in which one sees how an effect may be produced by considering possible "missings and checks." In other words, Eliot's story includes the story running in Rosamond's mind-precisely the sort of deluded affair Dawes castigates-as well as a narrator's intelligent commentary on it, a commentary that anticipates recent critiques of defective reasoning by over 100 years. determines the overall meaning of a work. The relevant point here is not only that a narrative can be made insightful by adding a narrator's intelligent commentary on particular events, thereby offsetting the bad effects of narrativity. Instead, there can be a reversal of valence, such that elements that in one context might indeed function as a misleading emphasis on a particular case can in another context make a positive contribution to an utterance's epistemic value. In some cases, it is the description of particular events that insightfully challenges the bad generalizations proffered by a narrator (an example being Fyodor Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground).
Middlemarch and many other examples challenge the simple thesis that story structure alone
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Unless 'narrativity' or 'the story structure' are rather implausibly stipulated to cover all of the meaningful features or contents of utterances (or thoughts) classified as narratives, it can be shown that, whatever scalar property or cluster of properties the term 'narrativity' is taken to name, this item underdetermines the meaning of particular stories or narrative utterances. This is the case because, given any such stipulation of narrativity, we can easily find or formulate two or more different utterances that satisfy this condition equally well, but which have strikingly incompatible meanings; similarly, two utterances expressing the same ideas can have strikingly different degrees of narrativity. Assuming that, with the exception of strictly analytic sentences, meaning does not determine truth, it follows that the narrativity of a narrative utterance does not univocally determine its truth value (and truth or truth-conducivity are closely related to most, if not all, other properly epistemic desiderata). Now it is a truism that even a convincing story may fail in fact to convince some audience. So the epistemic effects of narratives are underdetermined by their narrativity in two ways: first in the determination of content and second in content's influence on uptake and perlocutionary effects. This truism-based narrativity underdetermination thesis is strictly incompatible with all strong theses about narrativity's logical link to some epistemic valence, but it also has important implications for weaker, probabilistic theses, as it casts doubt on the wisdom of trying to measure a correlation between good and bad epistemic effects and a single variable named 'narrativity,' especially in a context where the very identification of that variable remains problematic.
In a context where there is deep controversy over the nature of stories, it is fair to ask whether Dawes's assertions about the "structure" and consequences of stories live up to the high epistemic standards that Dawes elsewhere advocates. Dawes does not refer to any statistics yielded by a successful experimental metaphysics of stories (as there is none), and one may plausibly conjecture that he is simply reporting on some of his intuitions, which were likely to have been influenced by his well-warranted impatience with the egregiously misleading accounts that figure in his illustrative anecdotes. A worthwhile lesson in Dawes's work is that often people would do well to recognize their own ignorance on topics about which there are no good statistical data. 34 Yet he does not say why this insight should not be applied to the question of the structure and overall impact of stories. If stories that include casual conjectures based on a few anecdotes are unreliable, counterexamples can be mentioned:
1. Even when a narrative has successfully been designed to stir up specific emotions, it need not resolve the climactic feeling or affect, but may instead be designed to leave the members of the audience in a state of intense arousal, such as feelings of political indignation or anger.
2. Some narratives, and good ones too, are not designed to arouse affect, but are meant to have a predominantly if not exclusively cognitive or intellectual impact. The interest of Aesop's fables is their shrewd revelation of common foibles, and not any marked emotional response to the allegorical figures, about whom we are emotionally indifferent; a similar point holds with regard to various cerebral fictions by Jorge Luis Borges.
3. A standard notation of the moves in a particular chess game would not usually be taken as a narrative, but it could have a marked emotional cadence for chess cognoscenti.
Were Velleman's notion of narrativity nonetheless granted, would the epistemic verdict ring true?
Is narrativity, thus conceived, "at least conducive" to the error of mistaking subjective for objective understanding (pp. 20-21)? Doubts could be sounded by challenging the thought that narrativity tends to guide and arouse affect at the cost of genuine understanding. If appropriate affective response is what is at stake, correct uptake or recognition of at least some of the basic elements of the narrative's contents is an uncontroversial desideratum, and such uptake requires surprisingly complex inferences involving the features of the utterance, relevant conventions, contextual factors, and the intentions of the utterer(s) or maker(s). Whether such uptake entails other, serious epistemic shortcomings, such as being deeply persuaded by a sentimental movie's simplistic message, is not likely to be determined uniquely by the observer's emotive response. Even the observer's recognition of the property of narrativity (as identified by Velleman) has no tendency to yield a single epistemic valence. In some cases, when an utterance's emotive appeal is obvious, this is taken as a welcomed rhetorical quality, but in others, knowledge that the discourse reliably occasions an emotional cadence makes it less persuasive.
In sum, it is far from clear that we have any good reason to conjecture that there is a strong correlation between narrativity, items uncontroversially identified as narratives, emotionally provocative discourse, and epistemically misleading discourse. It would be interesting to learn whether any solid empirical evidence about such a correlation, assessed in relation to relevant contrast cases, can be discovered, but so far this is Zukunftsmusik. return, means-end, and problem-solution. Narrativity is a "fundamental configurational relation," namely, "that of beginning, middle, and end" taken as a strictly temporal ordering principle that obtains in all lived, human experience. Whereas MacIntyre's implicit concept of narrative or story clearly excludes many cases that are likely to be thought to exhibit sufficient narrativity, Carr's exhibits the contrary tendency. For example, Erik Satie's piano compositions amply satisfy Carr's conditions on narrativity, but it is dubious that they ought therefore to be recognized as instances of narrative.
Were we to accept Carr's broad concept of narrativity, what would follow? Carr's stipulation does block the familiar antirealist contention that there are no actual story-like patterns in the world, and that storytellers must therefore selectively construct such patterns in their narratives and then misleadingly project them onto the past. Yet his definition does not lend any support to the idea that narratives tend to be deeply informative by virtue of their narrativity, since scores of false utterances and erroneous thoughts satisfy his conditions. Given Carr's definition, an utterance of "David Carr published a false definition of narrativity" would count as a narrative, but Carr and like-minded advocates of narrative would be ill advised to find this statement epistemically rewarding as a result.
v. conclusion
Although the enormous literature on narrative pullulates with strong conclusions about the epistemic valence of narrative per se, arguments and evidence that lend genuine support to these claims remain scarce. Two characteristic and decisive shortcomings are (1) a failure to justify the preferred thesis concerning the nature of narrativity and the corresponding definition of 'narrative' and (2) a failure to establish that items possessing narrativity, as defined, can reasonably be expected either invariably or frequently to give rise to the epistemic valence figuring in the overall argument's conclusion.
My point is not that it is impossible to say anything interesting about the contribution to knowledge or error made by particular works and utterances that are generally agreed to be instances of narrative. Representations of sequences of events, and of agents and their strivings, can be instructive or misleading in a variety of ways. They can serve to illustrate or to challenge a theory, and in some instances they may contribute to hypothesis formation. Yet until empirical evidence about narrativity's role in the overall nexus of consequences has somehow been provided, it is wisest to give up on generalizations about the functions stories are supposed to have by virtue of their narrativity; this in turn entails a shift to a more systematic attention to the actual effects of particular narratives and types of content. To mention one such avenue of inquiry, influence the attitudes and behavior of persons pondering suicide. 38 To conclude with a paraphrase of Voltaire, doubt about the nature and intrinsic value of narrative may be a somewhat unpleasant state, but certainty on this topic is a ridiculous one. 39 
